No "one-size fits all"

Towards a principled approach for incentives in mobile crowdsourcing

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
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Background

- Mobile crowdsourcing
 - Participatory/mobile sensing
 - Mobile micro-labor
 - Traffic Monitoring







- Various requirements
 - Spatial coverage
 - Temporal response
 - User attentiveness
 - User participation

Different applications weight them differently

Incentives and mobile crowdsourcing

- Why incentives?
 - 🛧 spatial coverage, user engagement, contribution
- Types in desktop crowdsourcing
 - Micro-payments
 - Beyond money
 - altruism, enjoyment, reputation
- Types in mobile crowdsourcing
 - Micro-payments
 - Micro-labor
 - Altruism and social rewards
 - Participatory sensing



Ad-hoc, one-off solutions

Goal: Build a framework

Compare and characterize incentive mechanisms

- How to evaluate?
- Do users react differently?
- Tradeoffs?
- Best fit for application?

→This work

Experimentally derive characteristics of two incentive structures that help answer these questions

Dimensions of incentives

Reward Magnitude

 More/less money for the same job, pricing

Reward Structure

 How rewards are distributed: Payper-task, base salary + bonuses

Best Fit Incentive

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Reward Type

 Class of reward offered: monetary, game credit, "sweat-equity"


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Experiment: Evaluate two incentives

- Micro-payments
 - Guaranteed payoff
- Weighted Lottery
 - High risk : High reward
 - 20 winners, limit one per user
- Varied only structure of reward
 - Chose one deterministic and one probabilistic incentive structure for comparison

Experiment application

- Microsoft TechFest 2013
 - Two days, two 5-hour sessions, 151 booths, >3000 visitors
- 50 Phones scavenger hunt application
 - 10 clues \rightarrow Match clues to booths
 - Scan booth's 2D barcode to complete



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Measuring impact of structures

- 1. Recruitment Attracting users to campaign
- 2. Compliance Users completing tasks correctly
- User-Effort Amount of effort/time users are willing to put into each task

Results preview

- Micro-payments
 - Fewer, more productive users
- Weighted Lottery
 - More total tasks, less individual effort


1. Recruitment: greater with weighted lottery

- Micro-payments
 - Lower overall recruitment
 - Recruited 39 participants
 - 23 active participants
 - Lower expected payout
 - Lower willingness to participate

- Weighted Lottery
 - Higher recruitment
 - Recruited 57 participants
 - 39 active participants
 - Lure of low cost/high reward
 - Expected payouts favorable given low initial effort


2. Compliance:

- Micro-payments
 - 99 completed
 - Each user completed twice the number than weighted lottery (median)
- Weighted Lottery
 - 120 completed
 - Fewer tasks completed per user




2. Compliance: no correlation with popularity

• Are users willing to go "out of their way"?



3. User-effort: micro-payments=more engaged

- Time between first and last completed task
 - Most weighted lottery participants had much shorter active sessions





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3. User-effort: spatial coverage

Micro-payments

Weighted lottery






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3. User-effort: spatial coverage

Micro-payments

Weighted lottery



Results summary

- Weighted Lottery
 - More total tasks, more users, less individual effort
- Micro-payments
 - Fewer, more productive users

Discussion and Future Directions

- Further understand role of incentives for behavior change
 - Humans becoming integral parts of mobile system performance
- Incentive choice affects different aspects of user behavior
- Larger study for further characterization

Thank you!